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South Korea as a Global Actor: 
International Contributions to 
Development and Security
Philipp Olbrich and David Shim
South Korea recently hosted two major international events: the High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in December 2011 and the Nuclear Security Summit 
in March 2012. Both meetings underscore South Korea’s ambitions to increase 
its involvement in global development assistance and security.
Analysis
The Korean president Lee Myung-bak is pursuing a policy of international 
contributions with his “Global Korea” national security strategy. Foreign 
deployments of the South Korean military and an increase in development 
assistance are expressions of this policy. However, not only humanitarian 
reasons, but also the desire for global visibility, recognition and influence play 
a role in this context.
  South Korea joined the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee at 
the end of 2009; ten years previously this committee had still classified the 
country as a recipient state.
  When deploying its military to foreign countries, South Korea’s priorities are 
non-military assignments such as civil reconstruction, political consulting 
or medical support.
  The activities in the field of development assistance and security constitute 
core elements in the expansion of the country’s role in international relations.
  Considering South Korea’s economic and political development since the state’s 
inception in 1945, its further ascent in global politics cannot be ruled out.
Keywords: South Korea, development assistance, foreign military deployments, 
diplomacy
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South Korea’s Global Ambitions
The fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effec-
tiveness took place in the South Korean harbor 
city Busan from 29 November to 1 December 
2011. Over 2,000 government, civil society 
and business representatives from industrial 
as well as developing countries convened 
at the meeting to discuss the current  global 
development assistance situation. This was 
the second major international event under 
Lee Myung-bak’s government since the G20 
summit. The aspiration to exert influence on 
global processes and the desire for visibility 
were additionally advanced by means of 
the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012. 
The wish for influence and recognition is 
formulated in the “Global Korea” national 
security strategy. Not only does this document 
outline the risks and challenges to national 
security, but it also provides a concept for a 
foreign policy which envisions the expansion 
of South Korea’s international role. In addition 
to the maximization of national interests and 
other aspects, the significance of international 
reputation is stipulated as a power factor 
(Cheong Wa Dae 2009). This context is the 
background for South Korea’s global ambitions 
in development and security.
South Korea – From Recipient to Provider 
of Development Assistance
At the end of the Korean War in 1953, the 
peninsula’s economy was shattered. Under 
Park Chung-hee’s military dictatorship – and 
with assistance from the United States and 
others – the country recovered rapidly. The 
economy flourished and massive corporations 
were founded due to large-scale investments 
in export-relevant industries in conjunction 
with protectionism for the domestic market. 
Even though South Korea was classified as 
a recipient of development assistance until 
the 1990s, the country had already acted as a 
provider of assistance as early as 1987; however, 
its expenditures for development assistance 
at this time amounted to merely 24 million 
USD. Since then the South Korean budget 
has continually increased, reaching almost 
700 million USD under President Roh Moo-
hyun in 2007 (OECD 2011a). Nevertheless, this 
substantial amount did not automatically give 
rise to a more active participation in international 
development assistance endeavors. Therefore, 
the intention of President Lee Myung-bak’s 
“Global Korea” strategy is to promote South 
Korea’s development assistance activities, 
in the course of which a budget increase is 
planned and the efficiency of assistance is to 
be placed on the agenda. 
In late 2009 South Korea was accepted 
into the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), and thus 
joined the company of established industrial 
nations such as the USA, Germany and Japan. 
This was the first time that a former recipient 
country had joined the prestigious circle of 
provider nations. At the DAC, which provides 
90 percent of global development assistance 
funding, the provider nations coordinate their 
approaches to development assistance in order 
to enhance the efficiency of their development 
policies. Korean expenditures for official 
development assistance (ODA) have increased 
by 65 percent, from approximately 700 million 
USD to 1.2 billion USD, since Lee Myung-
bak’s inauguration in 2008. Additionally, 
South Korea provides substantial funding for 
humanitarian help for North Korea. This is not 
officially categorized as ODA.1 According to 
South Korea’s constitution, the entire Korean 
peninsula constitutes state territory. Thus, the 
government in Seoul views this matter as a 
purely Korean issue.
South Korea’s entire ODA of approximately 
1.2 billion USD constitutes 0.12 percent of the 
country’s gross national income. The DAC 
average of 0.32 percent is higher, but clearly 
fails to reach itself-proclaimed target of 0.7 
percent (OECD 2011a). The overall balance 
within the committee is very uneven: while 
Sweden allocates approximately 0.97 percent 
of its gross national income for development 
assistance, Germany only allocates 0.38 per-
cent and Italy merely 0.15 percent. South 
1 From 1991 to 2009 the so-called Inter-Korean Cooperation 
Fund financed projects with a total value of 7.7 billion 
USD (Kim 2010). However, since Lee’s inauguration its 
expenditures have been substantially reduced.
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Korea aims to reach 0.15 percent by 2012 and 
intends to increase this figure by 0.25 percent 
after a period of three years, a goal which is 
achievable considering the increase so far and 
in the event of a favourable economic forecast. 
However, in absolute figures, South Korea is 
at a comparatively low level. While Italy’s 
percentage is similar to South Korea’s, its 
expenditure of 3.1 billion USD for development 
assistance is two and a half times as high as 
South Korea’s. 
A further increase can be expected in 2012. 
South Korea has committed to adapting 
its international commitment to its growing 
economic possibilities, pointing to its own 
experiences as a recipient nation of development 
assistance and the country’s rapid economic 
recovery. At the same time, the government 
expects that the increase of foreign assistance 
will yield some returns; for example, a 
preference for South Korean corporations 
when contracts are being awarded, or 
privileged access to the natural resources of 
recipient countries (Cheong Wa Dae 2009). An 
examination of ODA allocation and several 
partnership agreements make this approach 
apparent. 
The regional allocation of funds is a decisive 
aspect of development assistance. Thirty 
percent of DAC development assistance funds 
are allocated to the sub-Saharan region as this is 
where the majority of less developed countries 
are located. However, South Korea spends only 
13 percent of its development budget here, 
preferring to make concentrated expenditures 
of more than 50 percent in the Asian region 
(OECD 2011a). From a geostrategic per-
spective this concentration makes sense, as 
the Asian continent is increasingly gaining 
influence in global politics (cf. Clinton 2011; 
The White House 2012). Within Asia the focus 
is on Vietnam, Mongolia and Indonesia. These 
countries receive approximately 20 percent of 
the development assistance funding. These 
are not severely underdeveloped countries, 
but countries with lucrative sales markets 
and substantial resources. Whereas Mongolia 
is among the ten countries with the world’s 
largest reserves of mineral resources (AA 
2011), Vietnam and Indonesia, respectively, 
produce 300,000 and 1 million barrels of crude 
oil daily. Angola is another example of this 
policy. With 5 percent, Angola is the African 
country that receives by far the largest amount 
of South Korean development assistance. The 
country also produces 2 million barrels of oil 
per day (EIA 2011).2
The regional allocation of development 
assistance illustrates that the recipient 
country’s economic potential as well as its 
resources are decisive factors in the granting 
of aid. This reciprocal policy is implemented 
although the DAC’s definition of public 
development assistance emphasizes that 
the promotion of the recipient countries’ 
economies and welfare must constitute the 
main objectives of any official development 
assistance (IMF 2003). While the objective of 
development assistance thus follows national 
interests, the regional concentration is also a 
result of the reform of South Korea’s ODA. 
Following an OECD recommendation, the 
previously extensive list of recipients has been 
shortened. As a consequence, 26 recipient 
countries have been named as the recipients 
of 70 percent of the direct funds.
The concentration of development assis-
tance on fewer recipients is in compliance 
with the aims of the 2005 Paris Declaration, 
which were agreed upon by leading industrial 
nations in order to increase the efficiency of 
their assistance. Further guidelines were 
decreed at the fourth High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in late 2011: 
private organizations and aspiring industrial 
nations are to be included in ad dition to 
the traditional provider nations for the 
purpose of strengthening so-called South-
South cooperation. At this meeting a global 
partnership for the effective implementation of 
development assistance was initiated with the 
aim of extending transparency, accountability 
and verifiability.3 Furthermore, aspiring coun-
tries such as Brazil, India and China were 
also signatories to the final Busan document. 
However, these three countries were able to 
ensure that the decreed procedures and rules 
are voluntary for them (OECD 2011b). This 
2 Thus, Angola is among the 12 leading oil producers 
worldwide.
3 The details and schedules for the new partnership have been 
postponed until negotiations in June 2012.
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lack of obligation means that the impediments 
to stricter controls and increased transparency 
for the steadily increasing allocation of 
development assistance by emerging countries 
remain. For example, the Chinese government 
has been accused of undermining customary 
assistance practices and exclusively pursuing 
own interests. In contrast, South Korea will 
be judged on the results of the summit, which 
require stronger efforts than a mere increase 
in ODA expenditures.
In addition to the regional concentration, 
the large discrepancy between bilateral and 
multilateral assistance can be explained against 
the background of South Korea’s global am-
bitions. Multilateral aid has the advantage of 
economy-of-scale effects. These effects occur 
when many countries pay their aid funds 
into a single account, which is then under the 
central management of organizations such as 
the World Bank and put to use according to 
specific development policies. The expertise of 
an organization that can distribute the funds 
as efficiently as possible is utilized. When the 
ODA is distributed by one single international 
organization, the visibility of the individual 
provider nation is reduced. As this contradicts 
the aims of the “Global Korea” strategy, it 
comes as no surprise that only 24 percent of 
Korea’s ODA is distributed multilaterally. 
The aim of increasing the budget for disaster 
relief to  6 percent of the entire development 
assistance is governed by a similar motivation. 
In ad dition to the humanitarian value, prompt 
and extensive assistance also increases the 
provider country’s visibility.
Foreign Deployments of the South 
Korean Military
The fact that issues of international security are 
increasingly acknowledged in South Korea’s 
foreign policy is an indication of the country’s 
global ambitions. An example is the Nuclear 
Security Summit in March 2012, where over 50 
heads of state and international organizations 
gathered in Seoul to discuss urgent issues 
regarding global nonproliferation such 
as measures against the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons of mass destruction and the 
prevention of the illegal trading of the nuclear 
material. 
The foreign deployment of the South Korean 
military is another example of the country’s 
global ambitions. The particular interest in 
international security and economic stability 
is not surprising as South Korea’s economy 
is largely based on its global exports. During 
the 1950s a United Nations (UN) mission took 
place on the Korean peninsula, and the country 
has been participating in UN peacekeeping 
missions since 1993. Between 2003 and 2008 
South Korea deployed the third-largest 
contingent, after the USA and Great Britain, 
of the multinational troops participating in the 
Iraqi Freedom operation. Until the expiration 
of the UN mandate for the mission in Iraq in 
late 2008, South Korean engineers and medical 
staff contributed to civil reconstruction in 
Iraq. The rebuilding of destroyed regions 
and the provision of humanitarian help are 
central elements of the missions when South 
Korea deploys its military abroad. These 
aspects are also the priority in missions that 
are not peacekeeping operations under direct 
UN mandate — for example, the mission in 
Afghanistan. They promote the diplomatic 
components of South Korean foreign military 
deployments. In addition to the humanitarian 
aspect, emphazising South Korea’s global 
responsibility serves the purpose of increasing 
the country’s repute.
Having experienced the Korean War 
(which ended in 1953), South Korea participates 
in UN peacekeeping measures and other 
multilateral missions. Approximately 300,000 
soldiers fought together with the United States 
in the Vietnam War. In the early 1990s South 
Korea was part of the coalition that ended 
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Since its 
admission to the UN in 1991, South Korea has 
been contributing soldiers for peacekeeping 
operations. Despite recurring tensions in 
relations with North Korea, President Lee 
Myung-bak’s predecessors sent parts of the 
military on foreign missions. Whereas the 
predecessors were more strongly influenced by 
the so-called “payback-syndrome,” according 
to which South Korea was indebted to the 
international community due to the support 
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received in the Korean War (Sesay 2002: 
203), Korea’s own interests have increasingly 
become the focus of foreign deployments 
under Lee.
Currently, 743 South Koreans are parti-
cipating in nine peacekeeping operations. 
The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 
with 480 soldiers, and the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 
with a contingent of 240 troops, constitute 
the two largest operations. The remaining 
missions involve single South Korean officers, 
police officers or experts with predominantly 
consultant or supervisory functions. When 
selecting the respective mission for South 
Korean participation, a focus is placed on 
nonmilitary activities. In addition to the 
supervision of the border region in South 
Lebanon, the South Korean military is also 
involved in the reconstruction of the country. 
This includes medical assistance, computer 
training, and lessons in the Korean writing 
system and Taekwondo, as well as the 
provision of support for local educational 
facilities. Furthermore, public relations work 
is conducted or exchanges and collaborations 
with military units from foreign countries are 
promoted as elements of military diplomacy 
(MND 2010). The focus of the Haiti mission 
is on medical support for the population and 
reconstruction; the same applies to the regional 
reconstruction team operating under ISAF 
command in Afghanistan. The operation off 
the coast of Somalia constitutes an exception 
to the usual practice of humanitarian mission 
objectives. In the context of the multinational 
operation Enduring Freedom at the Horn of 
Africa, South Korea has deployed a destroyer 
to guarantee safe passage for merchant ships 
and to conduct anti-piracy missions.
The South Korean government has at its 
dis posal a 3,000-strong standby force for 
foreign missions, a third of which is in a 
permanent state of immediate deployability. 
At the end of 2009 the South Korean parliament 
passed a law with a relatively cautious definition 
of peacekeeping operations with regard to its 
participation in UN peace missions. It only 
covers missions which, for example, contribute 
to the supervision of ceasefires, to the staging of 
elections, and to reconstruction or humanitarian 
help, and which have been mandated by the 
UN. The law does not provide for participation 
in the independent missions of NATO, the EU 
or other multilateral organizations.
In contrast to poorer countries, the com-
pensatory payments provided by the UN to 
deployed soldiers are of marginal relevance to 
South Korea. Rather, national interests are of 
predominant importance; for example, in So-
malia, where the objective is the immediate 
protection of an important trade route. How-
ever, the operational area for South Korean 
troops covers a region so extensive that only 
collaboration among several nations can make 
success likely. By deploying a destroyer, 
South Korea is involved in these international 
efforts. Collaboration is also stipulated as an 
objective for other foreign missions. Parti-
cipation in peacekeeping operations con-
stitutes an effective means of making concrete 
contributions to international security and 
increasing global visibility. As a consequence, 
South Korea is making efforts to increase the 
extent of its participation in multinational 
foreign missions, provided that they are 
supported by the international community. 
Additionally, the division of tasks in foreign 
missions and in development assistance in 
general generates many opportunities for 
collaboration with other countries.
South Korea’s Quest for International Status
South Korea’s historical background provides 
the motives for its extension of its international 
commitments. The government cites South 
Korea’s moral obligation and responsibility 
as a former developing country and site of 
a UN mission, and emphasizes international 
solidarity as a logically coherent consequence 
of increasing interdependency. However, at 
the same time, its activities in development 
assistance and security are identified as core 
elements for the extension of the country’s 
role in international relations (Cheong Wa 
Dae 2009). The “Global Korea” concept, 
which constitutes the globalization of Korea’s 
interest-driven policies, defines international 
commitment in precisely these areas as the 
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features of an actor with global ambitions. 
Whereas the attempt to globalize Korea’s 
foreign and security policies is not new – one 
example is the internationalization, segyehwa 
policy, of former president Kim Young-sam 
(1993–1998) – greater importance is now vested 
in increasing the country’s repute and status at 
the global level. In addition to the traditional 
power factors such as the military and the 
economic strength of the state, reputation is 
now seen as a core factor in gaining influence, 
exerting power and solidifying claims to a 
leading international position.
It is this background in particular against 
which Korea’s activities in the political fields 
of development and security should be 
assessed. Hence the “Global Korea” strategy 
declares: “Our contributions abroad and 
international peace-keeping activities should 
not be pursued merely as instruments of 
assistance. They should rather be approached 
from a comprehensive perspective of im-
proving Korea’s international standing and 
potential to serve overseas” (Cheon Wa Dae 
2009: 27). Increasing the country’s repute 
does not constitute an end in itself but rather, 
from the perspective of the government in 
Seoul, contributes to cultivating international 
relations according to its own ideas. Active 
participation in solving global problems serves 
not only to improve South Korea’s image, but 
also to exert influence on the international 
system (Cheong Wa Dae 2009: 13). From this, 
Korea derives its claim to a leading global role 
in the creation of the current world order. This 
claim is comparatively new in the country’s 
foreign and security policy discourse.
The activities in the fields of development 
assistance and international security serve to 
build a reputation for trustworthiness and 
reliability. As long as there is no supranational 
system supervising and sanctioning the 
adherence to promises (for example, promises 
of assistance) or even legal norms (for 
example, the prohibition of violence), these 
two attributes are decisive factors for a state 
intending to implement its interests.
While these political areas are an expression 
of an increased claim to self-assertion, there 
are further areas that also receive strategic 
attention: the exertion of influence on the in-
ternational economic order through various 
institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and the G20 process, 
as well as on global climate and environment 
policies by means of economic initiatives 
promoting sustainability, such as the Korean 
government’s “green” Low Carbon Green 
Growth model (Shim 2010). Further more, 
other actors are also demanding policies with 
a stronger global perspective. Thus, the USA 
no longer views the central foundation of 
Korea’s security policy, the military alliance 
between Seoul and Washington, as a regional 
security alliance, but rather as a global alliance 
to jointly master the challenges of international 
politics – for example, in the areas of security 
(for instance, terrorism) and development 
(for instance, emergency assistance). The UN 
Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, has asked his 
country to play a larger role in international 
matters and has, for example, asked for the 
deployment of peacekeeping troops to the 
newly founded state of South Sudan. 
While South Korea has seen an increase 
in its significance in international politics, it 
is also clear that the country is in the early 
stages  of its ambitions of being a global actor. 
However, considering the state’s achieve-
ments – industrialization, modernization and 
democratization – since its inception in 1945, 
a further ascent cannot be ruled out.
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